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Abstract
I examine the propensity of Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee (BoEMPC) members to
cast dissenting votes. In particular, I compare the type and frequency of dissenting votes cast by so-
called insiders (members of the committee chosen from within the ranks of bank staﬀ)a n do u t s i d e r s
(committee members chosen from outside the ranks of bank staﬀ). Signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the dissent
voting behaviour associated with these groups is evidenced. Outsiders are signiﬁcantly more likely to
dissent than insiders; however, whereas outsiders tend to dissent on the side of monetary ease, insiders do
so on the side of monetary tightness. I also seek to rationalise why such diﬀerences might arise, and in
particular, why BoEMPC members might be incentivised to dissent. Amongst other factors, the impact
of career backgrounds on dissent voting is examined. Estimates from logit analysis suggest that the eﬀect
of career backgrounds is negligible.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Like all monetary policy committees, the Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee (BoEMPC) is obliged
to reach decisions on the short-term interest-rate, even in the presence of substantial disagreement. When
a committee member does not hold the view of the majority, a way of registering such diﬀerence in opinion
is to vote against it, that is, to cast a dissenting vote. In this paper I compare the type and frequency of
dissenting votes cast by so-called insiders and outsiders. Insiders are BoEMPC members chosen from within
the ranks of Bank staﬀ, whereas outsiders are members chosen from outside the bank. I not only evidence
diﬀerences between these two groups, but explain why such diﬀerences might arise, and in particular, why
BoEMPC members might be incentivised to dissent.
To survey the results, it is determined that ﬁrstly, outsiders are much more likely to cast dissenting votes
than insiders. Interpreted diﬀerently, insiders have a signiﬁcantly higher chance of being on the winning side
of monetary policy decisions. Secondly, whereas insiders dissent for tighter policy more often than looser
policy, outsiders dissent overwhelmingly on the side of monetary ease. Also measured is the impact of career
backgrounds on dissent voting, an approach used in studies of FOMC dissent voting. Speciﬁcally, binary
logit analysis is used to estimate the eﬀect of career backgrounds on members’ propensity to dissent on side of
ease or tightness. The dataset used is highly truncated in that it uses only dissenting votes, and the analysis
to some extent draws on Havrilesky and Schweitzer (1990).1 When controlling for a member’s type,y e a r s
spent working in the private sector, the civil service and non-governmental organisations all contribute to a
member’s propensity to dissent on the side of ease or tightness, although the eﬀects are not highly pronounced.
The paper progresses as follows. I begin by relating the paper to previous studies on dissent voting, a
literature which falls into the ‘partisan theory of politics’ genre [Meade and Sheets (2002)]. I them develop
some priors. In particular, I look to reasons why the frequency and type of dissent voting associated with
insiders and outsiders might be expected to diﬀer. Amongst other things, I suggest that diﬀerences in
dissent voting behaviour is partially attributable to the presence of members’ career concerns - simply put,
disagreeing with fellow members may damage one’s career path, especially if one is an insider. However, other
factors may come into play, and for any individual member, dissent voting behaviour may not necessarily be
driven by any single factor in isolation, but by a combination thereof. Following this, I formally deﬁne is
meant by dissent, and proceed to evidence the dissent voting behaviour of BoEMPC members for the ﬁrst
ﬁve years of the MPC.2 Monthly voting data from minutes of MPC meetings between July 10th 1997 — 6th
June 2003 is used. The career backgrounds of MPC members and associated econometric evidence relating
this to dissent voting is then presented. The paper concludes by addressing the implications of the ﬁndings
for the future conduct of UK monetary policy.
2 Relationship to the Literature
Previous studies of dissent voting in MPCs (i) fall into the ‘partisan theory of politics’ genre and (ii)t y p -
ically consider the case of the FOMC. The approach used in this paper draws mainly on Belden (1989)
and Havrilesky and Schweitzer (1990). Belden analyses the record of dissenting votes from FOMC meetings
with a view to identifying diﬀerences in the dissent voting behaviour of Bank presidents and Board members.
Bank presidents dissent more frequently than Board members, with the latter group preferring to dissent
on the side of ease, and the former on the side of monetary tightness. The reason for the observed diﬀer-
ences, according to Belden, lay in the diﬀerent appointments procedures for each type of member. Board
Governors are appointed by the US President, thereby lacking the independence of Bank Presidents. Be-
cause Belden assumes that governments have an in-built bias towards activist policy,3 the ﬁnding that Board
1Meade and Stasavage (2004) draw on the literature on the career concerns of experts in explaining the dissenting votes of
outsiders.
2During this period, Sir Edward George also presided as Governor of the Bank of England.
3The idea that governments have an inbuild inﬂatonary bias does not convince everyone. Charles Goodhart (1997),am e m b e r
of the MPC with an academic background, is a key example of someone who questions the wisdom embodied in writings on
time-consistent monetary policy:
“Whilst I have consistently supported central bank autonomy in setting interest rates, to achieve an inﬂation set
by the political authorities, I have at the same time had doubts about the virtues of the main theoretical analysis
paraded in support of that step, i.e. the time-inconsistency argument. There is little compelling evidence that
2Governors have a greater propensity to dissent on the side of monetary ease than Bank Presidents is not
unexpected. Further, Bank Presidents are less inﬂuential in setting monetary policy than Board members -
they feature on the losing side of decisions more often than Board members. Like Belden (1989), Havrilesky
and Schweitzer (1990) is premised on the notion that all governments have a time-consistent inﬂationary
bias. FOMC members whose career backgrounds are more ‘proximate’ to central government are more
liable to conform to such bias, and the more one conforms to it, the greater the propensity to dissent on
the side of ease. Conversely, members whose experiences are relatively further from of central government
are more likely to dissent on the side of tightness. Havrilesky and Schweitzer make assumptions about the
kinds of career characteristics which lead to a members having more of a propensity to dissent on the side of
ease or tightness. As discussed later, their assumptions might not hold in the context of UK monetary policy.
The latter point is worth elaborating on. Care should be taken when comparing the results of FOMC
studies with BoEMPC studies. On the one hand, the distinction between insiders and outsiders has some
parallels with that made between Bank presidents and Board members in many studies of FOMC voting
behaviour. In this sense, I adopt an approach which belongs to the long tradition of studies examining
the voting behaviour of US Federal Open Market Committee members. However, this similarity should not
be stretched too far. As one might expect, FOMC studies are geared towards the institutional nuances of
the US Federal Reserve and US political system. I suggest that the notion of ‘partisanship’, despite its
applicability to US studies is more diﬃcult to apply to the case of the MPC. Firstly, the government plays a
role in all appointments to the MPC, for both external and internal appointments. Even insiders appointed
from within the Bank by the Governor must have the approval of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Contrast
this with the nature of the appointments procedure to the FOMC. All Federal Reserve Board Governors are
appointed by the President. Contrastingly, Bank Presidents are chosen without political interference, and
the President has all but no say in the matter. Secondly, many approaches used to test for ‘partisanship’4
in FOMC studies cannot be applied here due to data limitations. The entire sample period falls within the
incumbency of the British Labour Party. Appealing to the partisan theory is thus rendered less attractive
when compared to, say, US studies where the monetary policy preferences of individual FOMC members
are modelled as a function of the political aﬃliation of the individuals who appointed them. These studies
typically cover periods which include diﬀerent political administrations, Republican and Democrat. For
example, Chappell et al (1993) conclude that
“...the power to make appointments provides an important channel of systematic partisan inﬂu-
ence...Democratic appointees favour easier monetary policies than traditional Republicans do, and supply-
side Republicans prefer even easier policies than Democrats do.”(p.209)
Nevertheless, in spite of such diﬀerences, this does not preclude the author from undertaking a thorough and
systematic analysis of dissent voting for the British case. Further, the analysis of dissent voting in this paper
extends Gerlach-Kristen (2002), who provides a descriptive breakdown of MPC voting behaviour.
3 Rationalising Dissent Amongst Insiders and Outsiders - Some
Priors
The analysis in this section endeavours to rationalise, ap r i o r i , why rates of dissent amongst insiders might
diﬀer from those associated with outsiders. It predicts that the rate of dissent will be lower for insiders
than outsiders. Previous work in this area has have evidenced large discrepancies in insider-outsider voting
behaviour. Spencer (2005b) presents evidence suggesting that whereas insiders vote as a bloc, outsiders
are less prone to do so. Spencer (2005a) demonstrates that on average, insiders prefer systematically higher
governments have sought consciously to use expectational inertia to trick people into working harder, in pursuit of
a short-run electoral feel good factor, and, indeed little evidence, given to the long lags in monetary policy and the
wide range of uncertainty surrounding the eﬀects of such policies over time on nominal incomes and prices. Yet
in most time-inconsistency models, the monetary authorities can control prices instantly and perfectly! Absolute
nonsense. Yet this model not only survives, but is highly inﬂuential. This is partly because it combines technical
mathematical virtuosity with a fashionable cynicism about the motives and agendas of politicians.”
4See for example Hibbs (1997). For more recent contributions on the partisan theory of politics, the interested reader is
referred to Alesina (1987), Alesina and Sachs (1988), Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) and Boix (2000).
3interest rates than outsiders for any given MPC meeting, a diﬀerence which was is to be statistically sig-
niﬁcant. In justifying the prediction that insiders should dissent less frequently than outsiders, I appeal
to the career incentives facing MPC members, the career backgrounds and experiences of MPC members,
the appointments procedure, term lengths of MPC members and the information sets used by members to
arrive at a decision. This list of reasons given here is by no means exhaustive, but I feel suﬃcient to capture
the main determinants of dissent voting behaviour of BoEMPC members. Further, I suggest that for any
individual member, voting behaviour may not necessarily be driven by any single factor in isolation, but by
a combination thereof.
3.1 Career Incentives
Whereas the career paths of internal appointees are linked to the bank, the same cannot be said for outsiders,
whose future career paths may all be linked to a plethora of diﬀerent organisations. Accordingly, insiders
have an incentive to ‘get on’ with each other as they may have to work with each other long after they have
ﬁnished serving on the MPC. For this reason, I propose that insiders face more pressure to vote as a group
on the MPC than outsiders.5 Evidence that the career concerns of members of monetary policy committees
can aﬀect voting behaviour is well documented in Havrilesky and Schweitzer (1990). Cited therein are the
comments of Lawrence Roos, President of the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank and member of the FOMC,
who maintains that:
“If one is a young, career oriented president who’s got a family to feed he tends to be more moderate
in his opposition to Governors.”6
Clearly, the suggestion here is that Governors exert a very real inﬂuence on the future career paths of Bank
Presidents - Bank Presidents with aspirations of advancing their career further within the Federal Reserve
System may feel under pressure not to vote against those individuals serving on the FOMC who may have a
bearing on their future career.7 For this reason, Havrilesky and Schweitzer propose that there is a degree of
disutility associated with dissenting.
Secondly, career progression within a central bank may be a function of behaving like a ‘central banker’.
Arguably insiders act in a way consistent with their perception of what being a central banker requires. As
central bankers are associated with conservatism,8 this leads to them acting conservatively when setting
monetary policy.9 In practice, this could lead to insiders preferring ceteris paribus higher interest rates than
5This may explain the some of the empirical results on BoEMPC voting behaviour shown in Spencer (2005b).
6Havrilesky and Schweitzer (1990), p.3. Also cited is the opinion of Henry Wallich, a member of the Board of Governors:
“It is not a pleasant thing to have to keep dissenting...One dissents less often than you would think. After all
y o ua r eam e m b e ro fag r o u pa n dy o uw a n tt og e ta l o n gw i t ht h eo t h e rm e m b e r s . ”
7There is also the possibility that sequential voting - which is the practice enjoyed by the MPC - may lead to diﬀerent
outcomes than simultaneous voting. For example, the government itself aired views to the eﬀe c tt h a ti tw o u l da l lo t h e rt h e
things being considered prefer MPC members to vote simultaneously and not sequentially.
“We remain to be convinced that the process of voting in the MPC is suﬃciently robust. We recommend that
the Governor and the MPC itself, gives further attention to the voting procedure and in particular to a system
of simultaneous voting.” (emphasis added by author) Response of the Government to the Report of the House
of Lords Select Committee on the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England (HL Paper 34, Session
2000-01)
This is not a moot point. In the presence of career concerns sequential voting may indeed have consequences for voting outcomes,
as noted by Scharfstein and Stein (1990):
“...consider the case of a capital budgeting committee meeting, where the managers are supposed to vote in
turn on an investment project. Ideally the point of having several manages vote is to gather a wide range of
information. However, if career concerns are present, this may not work very well. Once the ﬁrst manager has
voted, the others may simply echo his choice, regardless of their private beliefs. Thus a false consensus is achieved,
and the information of the other managers is wasted.” Scharfstein and Stein (1990), pp. 477-478.
Although not fully explored here, the herding literature may oﬀer a plausible explanation for the discrepancies in insider-outsider
behaviour. Bank Insiders may simply ‘follow the leader’, so to speak.
8This is a view espoused in much of the theoretical literature on time-consistent monetary policy. Consider Rogoﬀ (1986)
who concludes that optimal monetary policy is delivered when central bankers are conservative, but not too conservative.
9The notion that people modify their behaviour in accordance with the roles or labels they are given is well established in
the psychology literature. Consider Philip G. Zimbardo’s well known prison experiments conducted at Stanford University in
4outsiders, support for which is found in Spencer (2005a). It may also imply that when insiders dissent, they
would prefer to do so on the side of tightness: it basically signals their credentials as ‘conservative’ central
bankers.
3.2 Career Backgrounds
The premise that career backgrounds and experiences have a role in explaining the voting behaviour of
members of monetary policy committees is a theme which has been well explored in the FOMC literature.
Yet in appealing to the career backgrounds of MPC members to explain their voting behaviour, one must
be careful not to apply the same priors as those used to explain those of the FOMC. Consider the eﬀect of
working in government as a civil servant. In studies focussing on FOMC voting behaviour, it is assumed
that experience in government will be positively related to a member’s propensity to vote on the side of ease,
as opposed to tightness, as in Havrilesky and Schweitzer (1990) and Gildea (1990). The more time spent
working in government, the more one conforms to the government’s in-build bias towards activist policy.
Chappell et al (1993,1995) ﬁnd that where partisan behaviour does arise, it is to some extent attributable
to the career backgrounds of FOMC members, concluding that
“...experience in government, particularly at the Federal Reserve Board, is associated with signiﬁcantly
stronger preferences for monetary ease...”10
However, in the UK, civil servants have a long tradition of neutrality,s ot h ee ﬀect of experience working
in government on voting behaviour may be hard to call. Thus, unlike the literature on FOMC voting, it
is hard to form priors regarding how members will vote. Indeed, reported estimates from the regression of
career backgrounds, presented later, suggests that experience in government promotes dissent on the side of
tightness, contrary to Chappell et al (1993,1995).
As a further example, FOMC studies assume that a background in or training as an academic economist
leads members to behave less hawkishly. This is supposed to reﬂect the fact that many economists serving on
the FOMC received their training in the heyday of Keynesianism, where policy was characterised by demand-
management, with less emphasis on supply-side measures. Academic economists are thus assumed to be
sympathetic to output, and are ceteris paribus more likely to act to stimulate demand via reducing interest
rates. It is certainly also true that the impact of Keynesianism was more pervasive in the UK than the US.
One might therefore predict that economists with an academic background serving on the MPC are more
likely to dissent on the side of monetary ease than tightness. Yet this rationale fails to reﬂect the enormous
inﬂuence of the literature on time-consistent monetary policy on the economic community, in addition to for
example, the impact of the Chicago school. It is worth recalling that Professor Alan Walters, who served as
Chief Economic Adviser to Margaret Thatcher 1980-1984 and 1989, was an vocal proponent of supply side
policies. More recently, Professor Patrick Minford, a well known UK British supply side economist was one
of the so-called “six wise men” serving on HM Treasury’s Panel of Forecasters. According to Seldon (1987),
Minford was
“...formally deeply steeped in Keynesian macro-thinking, but has propounded a micro-founded Rational
Expectations theory based on the idea that...economic expectations are based on the eﬃcient use of
available information.” (p.12)
If anything, this demonstrates that even if one does receive a Keynesian style training, one’s views may shift
seismically over time.
In light of the preceding discussion on career incentives, however, I suggest that previous experience at the
Bank is most likely to promote dissent on the side of monetary tightness. Other career backgrounds such as
working in the private sector and experience in independent trans-national organisations may be ambiguous.
In the case of private sector experience - if private sector experience is dominated by manufacturing it may
promote dissents on the side of ease, whereas the banking sector may promote dissents on the side of tightness.
1971. Here, participants quickly assumed the roles of ‘guards’ and ‘prisoners’. Although the experiment was planned to last for
two weeks, it was stopped after a mere six days. The ‘guards’ directed increasingly cruel behaviour towards the prisoners, who
began to exhibit depressive tendencies and behaviour associated with extreme stress. We note here that university students
were the subjects of the experiment.
10Chappell, Havrilesky and McGregor (1995), p.130. Similar conclusions are also reached in Chappell, Havrilesky and
McGregor (1993).
53.3 Appointments Procedure
The Chancellor has a potentially signiﬁcant bearing on the direction of UK monetary policy. In addition to
powers to set and change the inﬂation target at will, the power of appointment represents a further vehicle
for inﬂuencing the direction of UK monetary policy. This is relevant in two respects. In the ﬁrst case,
this amounts to the last word on the appointment of and, if considered necessary, reappointment of the
Governorship of the Bank of England. This is particularly signiﬁcant if one considers that the Governor of
the Bank also sits as Chairman of the Monetary Policy Committee and has the casting vote in split MPC
decisions. The second issue pertains to the appointment and selection procedures for MPC members on a
more general level, and is a consideration which is not restricted to the Bank of England MPC. For instance,
in the case of the ECB, Dornbusch et al (1998) is notable for highlighting the way in which the selection
procedure, regional or political aﬃliations of members of the ECB Governing Council may inﬂuence monetary
policy decisions at the ECB.
‘[Firstly] the selection process that puts them in place may be systematically biased, so that they are
‘hawks’ or ‘doves’ chosen to be just that. Secondly, regional economic conditions may diverge signiﬁcantly
from the average of the monetary zone, and this may lead a particular board member to respond in a
diﬀerential way.’11
Belden (1989,1991), Chappell et al (1993,1995) and Havrilesky and Gildea (1989) propose equivalent argu-
ments with respect to the composition of the US Federal Open Market Committee. Belden (1991) describes
t h ea p p o i n t m e n t sp r o c e d u r ef o rt h eF O M C :
“Members of the Board of Governors are appointed by the President and congress and the Senate.
Bank presidents, on the other hand, are appointed by the directors of each Federal Reserve district bank
and accepted by the Chairman. No elected representatives participate directly in the choice of the Bank
presidents.”
She later adds
“If the lack of Senate conﬁrmation does not result in bank presidents who have policy preferences
that are diﬀerent from Board members, the issue [of how FOMC members are appointed] is moot...But
ad i ﬀerence in policy preferences is evident from the record of dissenting votes.”
Whilst BoEMPC members cannot be construed as providing regional representation,12 the shift to operational
independence has not left the MPC immune to political manipulation vis-à-vis the appointments procedure.
As the power of appointment rests with the Chancellor, he may appoint ‘doves’ or ‘hawks’ to be just that.13
Indeed, the government plays an inﬂuential role in choosing all MPC members. The precise extent of its
inﬂuence arguably varies in relation to the type of member being appointed. Whereas all outsiders are
chosen directly by the Chancellor, two of the internal appointees serving on the MPC are chosen by the
Governor of the Bank of England after consultation with the Chancellor. Cobham (2000) argues that the
appointments procedure for MPC members is “opaque” and “incapable of securing public trust or market
credibility”.14 He further attests that the decision in June 2000 to appoint Christopher Allsopp rather than
renew the contract of Charles Goodhart
“...may have been designed to steer the MPC into keeping interest rates as low as possible for the
next election.”15
11Dornbusch et al (1998),p . 2 5 .
12See for example Buiter and Sibert (2002):
“The only criteria supposed by which potential MPC members in the UK are to be judged is professional
competence and independence. They are not viewed as regional, industrial or sectoral delegates or representatives.
Only the nationwide inﬂation objective and the nationwide subsidiary objectives are to be taken into account by
the Chancellor in their appointment and by the MPC members themselves in their voting behaviour.” (p.10)
13It is also a consideration which has a bearing on the credibility of the delegation. The interested reader is referred to Sibert
(2001) for a formal treatment of this issue.
14Financial Times, 10th August 2000.
15Ibid.
6Evidence presented in the next section provides support for this conjecture - in practice, whereas Goodhart
dissented only on the side of tightness (on 3 occasions), Allsopp dissented only on the side of ease (11
occasions), a case of a ‘hawk’ being replaced by a ‘dove’. The Evening Standard spoke of Charles Goodhart
being ‘forced to step down against his will’, duly noting that the Treasury was ‘standing by its appointment’,16
in spite of Allsopp’s rejection by the Commons Treasury Select Committee on the grounds of being ill-suited
for the position. At the time, the debacle was reported as a dispute which
“...raises questions about Allsopp’s credibility...City economists were already speculating that he
would initially be under pressure to vote with Bank chief Eddie George at the monthly meetings...Despite
ac l o s eﬁve-four vote against endorsing his nomination...all were of the view that he was unsuitable.”17
The opaque nature of the appointments procedure is further captured in the following exchange between
Andrew Tyrie MP, member of the Treasury select committee and Richard Lambert, who joined the MPC in
May 2003:
Andrew Tyrie: “...one thing has surprised me, which is that there was no formal interview process
at all, as far as I can tell. If you were creating a system in order to appoint people to something
l i k et h eM P C ,d oy o ut h i n kt h a ti tm i g h tb es e n s i b l et oh a v es o m ek i n do ff o r m a li n t e r v i e ww h e r ey o u
sit in front of someone at least for 20 minutes or so, or a couple of people, and have an exchange of views?”
Richard Lambert: “I have not really thought through that. I do not really know the answer to that.
My conversations, which were necessarily on the telephone, were lengthy.”
Andrew Tyrie: “Did it not cross your mind to wonder whether a couple of calls to Japan was all there
w a st ob e c o m i n gam e m b e ro ft h eM P C ? ”
The exchange continues:
Andrew Tyrie: “Do you know of any other very important and challenging job which is appointed over
the phone on a long distance call?”
Richard Lambert: “I do not know enough about how government ministers are appointed or civil
servants are appointed to be able to answer that question.”
Andrew Tyrie: “You and I both know that permanent secretaries are interviewed before they take
their post, that cabinet secretaries are given extensive interviews by the Prime Minister. You know that
already.”
Richard Lambert:“ Y e s ”
Andrew Tyrie:“ S ot h a tw a saﬂippant reply from you.”
Richard Lambert: “Forgive me; I apologise.”18
Given the opaqueness of the appointments procedure I therefore tentatively suggest that the appointment
of outsiders is a potential vehicle for packing out a substantial portion of MPC with doves. It is arguably
more diﬃcult to appoint an opportunistic or dovish Governor given the intense public scrutiny surrounding
associated with such a decision - the credibility of the Bank would suﬀer
3.4 Term Lengths
Both the Governor and the two Deputy Governors serving on the MPC are appointed for terms of ﬁve years.
This is longer than the three year terms given to all other MPC members, and increases reduces a members
independence from the Chancellor. This is a point which has been seized upon by economists and politicians
alike. Michael Howard (2002), leader of the Conservative Party comments that
16Evening Standard 24th May 2000.
17Ibid.
18Oral evidence of Mr Richard Lambert, taken before the Treasury Committee on Monday 16 June 2003, Questions 65-69.
http://www.parliament.the-stationery-oﬃce.co.uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmtreasy/811/3061601.htm
7“One practical problem which has emerged is that the relatively short, three-year term for MPC
members is often considered too short, while reappointment leads to relatively lengthy terms of oﬃce and
also diminishes members’ independence from the Chancellor.” (emphasis added)
Under this interpretation, MPC members which have shorter tenures to serve should vote in more partisan
fashion. Those members with a relatively longer term of oﬃce should exhibit more independence, and are
less prone to lower interest rates before an election. In other words, it might be expected that members
with shorter term lengths are more prone to exhibiting dovish tendencies. The fact that the two internal
members are appointed with three year terms is tempered by the fact that they are chosen by the Governor
of the Bank in consultation with the Chancellor. For this reason, it is plausible to suggest that outsiders,
all of who serve three year terms, will exhibit more dovish tendencies than insiders - precisely what is seen
in practice. Outsiders are the least independent of all MPC members.
3.5 Information Sets
Diﬀerent BoEMPC members will invariably be both exposed to and receptive to diﬀerent sources of informa-
tion during their time on the MPC. Sushil Wadhwani (2002) is an example of an MPC member to openly
express doubts about the eﬃcacy of the suite of Bank of England models used in the forecast of inﬂation
and GDP. These forecasts, which form the basis of the Bank’s Inﬂation Report, are purportedly integral to
decisions on the interest-rate, and are supposed to represent the ‘collective judgement’ of the MPC. I suggest
that Bank insiders may de facto have more faith than outsiders in the suite of in-house models used in the
generation of the forecasts of inﬂation and GDP. Speaking in May 2002, Wadhwani, an outsider who served
on the MPC between June 1999-May 2002 attested:
“...the MPC has, in the past been criticised on account of its forecasting performance. I note that
the actual outturn for inﬂation has always been lower than the MPC’s two-year ahead forecast, with an
average error of up to around 0.5%....to the extent that policy was held too tight because of a biased
forecast, a challenge for the future is to ensure that any relevant lessons from the past.”19
Furthermore, and in light of the budget of April 17th 2002 given by Chancellor Brown, the Inﬂation Report
itself comes in for criticism:
“In my opinion, the central projection embodied in the May 2002 inﬂation report probably assumes
a higher pass-through into prices than is likely, and too large a ‘balanced budget stimulus’ to demand
growth next year.”20
With respect to the MPC’s position on GDP growth, he later adds
“Over the past few years, the MPC has...had too gloomy a view about the level of potential output in
the economy. Although some adjustments about this view have been made, I would regard the current
view about the level of potential output as still being too pessimistic.”21
If insiders - who have an in-built majority over outsiders - place their faith a suite of in-house econometric
models at the Bank of England which have a tendency to over-predict the level of future inﬂation [Wallis
(2002)] this may predict a higher rate of dissents on the side of ease associated with outsiders. It may be the
case that outsiders have more of a tendency to follow private sector, independent and consensus forecasts of
inﬂation - for example, over the sample period considered in this paper, twelve month consensus forecasts22
predict a level of future inﬂation which is systematically lower that the Bank’s 24 month horizon RPIX
forecasts.23
19Wadhwani (2002),p . 1 .
20Ibid,p . 3
21Ibid,p . 1 0 .
22As given in HM Treasury’s Compenduim of Economic Forecasts for the UK Economy.
23Consider Goodhart (2001) goes much further than Wadhwani in criticising of the inﬂation and GDP projections in the
Inﬂation Report. He suggests that nobody on the MPC believed them:
“...the introduction of outside experts into a Committee process of forecasting is inevitably likely to generate
some tension and disagreements.”Goodhart (2001), p.62.
He raises the distinct possibility that:
84 Dissenting Votes
4.1 Deﬁning Dissent
The information provided in the Minutes identiﬁes who the dissenting voters are at each meeting, and whether
they dissented on the side of ease or tightness. This level of detail enables a meaningful analysis of dissent
voting behaviour. Three types of dissent are identiﬁed: dissent, dissent for tighter policy and dissent for
looser policy. There are important caveats to these classiﬁcations, which will become clear in the following
deﬁnitions.
• Dissent:O nt h i sd e ﬁnition, a dissenting vote is deﬁned as a vote against the interest-rate chosen by
the majority of MPC members at each meeting. However, this ‘broad’ deﬁnition of dissent makes no
distinction between dissenting for tighter or looser policy. The remaining two deﬁnitions, which fall
into the broader category of dissent are thus deﬁned accordingly:
• Dissent for tighter policy:T h i si sd e ﬁned as where a member reveals a preference for a higher short-
term interest-rate relative to the actual decision on the short-term interest-rate taken by the MPC.
On this deﬁnition a member may vote for no change or a decrease in the current interest-rate but still
be classed as dissenting for tighter policy if the actual rate chosen by the MPC is greater than their
preferred rate.
• Dissent for looser policy:D e ﬁned as where a member reveals a preference for a lower short-term interest-
rate relative to the actual short-term interest-rate chosen by the MPC. On this deﬁnition a member
may vote for no change or an increase in the current interest-rate but still be classed as dissenting for
looser policy if the actual rate chosen by the MPC is less than their desired rate.
4.2 The MPC’s Dissent Voting Record
Tables 1-3 document the dissent voting behaviour of the MPC. Table 1 chronicles the voting record of
insiders and outsiders on an individual and collective basis. The ﬁrst column shows the total number of
votes cast by MPC members. As one would expect, the ﬁgures for individual members vary according to the
diﬀerent length of appointments and the overlapping nature of members’ terms. Numbers in the last three
columns pertain to the number of dissenting votes cast, and correspond to the three types of dissent deﬁned
above. Figures in round brackets (.) express the number of dissenting votes cast as a proportion of the total
number of votes cast.24
The pattern of dissenting votes is very diﬀerent for insiders and outsiders. Outsiders dissented approx-
imately 27% of the time, compared with around 8% for insiders. This disparity is reﬂected in the votes
of individual members in both groups. Sir Edward George recorded no dissents - he was never on the
losing side of a monetary policy decision during his time as Chairman of the MPC.25 Moreover, the largest
proportion of dissenting votes cast by an insider is 18%, by John Vickers. This level of dissent is relatively
low by outsiders’ standards. Just under one half of all of Buiter’s, and one third of the votes of De Anne
Julius and Sushil Wadhwani were dissenting.
Af u r t h e rﬁnding is that whereas the overwhelming majority of dissenting votes cast by insiders are on
the side of tightness, for outsiders the overwhelming majority are on the side of monetary ease. Collectively,
“...the actual modal forecast at the heart of the Inﬂation Report was believed in - as the most likely outcome
- by no one on the MPC; it was itself an average over Members....Take for example the assumption about the
exchange rate, a key element in the forecast...some on the MPC thought the use of uncovered interest parity (UIP)
provided the best analytical basis for considering the future of the exchange rate; others assumed that it was
dominated in practical forecasting by assuming a random walk (i.e. a constant future exchange rate). With the
two groups being roughly evenly balanced the compromise was to assume half-way between the two, which nobody
believed! Truly a camel is a horse designed by a Committee.”Ibid, p.63.
24Calculate this by dividing the number of votes votes cast in each dissenting category by the total number of votes cast in
each row.
25It is certainly possible for the Chairman to lose a vote. This happened for the ﬁrst time during the 100th meeting of the
MPC in August 2005. Mervyn King, the successor to Sir Edward George as Governor of the Bank and Chairman of the MPC,





Eddie George 74 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
Howard Davies 2 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
Charles Bean 34 1 (3%) 0 (0%) 1 (3%)
David Clementi 61 4 (7%) 3 (5%) 1 (2%)
Paul Tucker 13 1 (8%) 1 (8%) 0 (0%)
Ian Plenderleith 61 5 (8%) 3 (5%) 2 (3%)
Andrew Large 9 1 (11%) 1 (11%) 0 (0%)
Mervyn King 74 12 (16%) 12 (16%) 0 (0%)
John Vickers 28 5 (18%) 5 (18%) 0 (0%)
All Insiders 356 29 (8%) 25 (7%) 4 (1%)
Excluding Governor 282 29 (10%) 25 (9%) 4 (1%)
Outsiders
Charles Goodhart 36 3 (8%) 3 (8%) 0 (0%)
Kate Barker 26 3 (12%) 0 (0%) 3 (12%)
Sir Alan Budd 18 4 (22%) 4 (22%) 0 (0%)
Stephen Nickell 38 9 (24%) 3 (8%) 6 (16%)
Marian Bell 12 3 (25%) 0 (0%) 3 (25%)
Christopher Allsopp 37 11 (30%) 0 (0%) 11 (30%)
De Anne Julius 45 14 (31%) 0 (0%) 14 (31%)
Sushil Wadhwani 37 13 (35%) 0 (0%) 13 (35%)
Willem Buiter 36 17 (47%) 9 (25%) 8 (22%)
Richard Lambert 1 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
All Outsiders 286 77 (27%) 19 (7%) 58 (20%)
All Members
All MPC members 642 106 (17%) 44 (7%) 62 (10%)
Excluding Governor 568 106 (19%) 44 (8%) 62 (11%)
a The number of votes cast by each member is identical to the total number of meetings attended by each
member.
MPC Dissent by Member
Dissent
ψ
Dissent for Tighter 
Policy
Dissent for Looser 
Policy
ψDissent is equivalent to the sum of dissents for tighter policy plus dissents for looser policy. Numbers in round
brackets (.) show the corresponding percentage of dissenting votes cast by each member/group. For
example, in the case of Willem Buiter, the percentage of dissents is calculated by dividing the number of
dissents by the total number of votes cast and multiplying by 100 (i.e. (17/36)×100 ≈ 47%). All percentages
are rounded to the nearest integer.
Dissenting Votes
Table 1.
Dissenting votes cast by MPC members by frequency and type
10insiders voted to dissent on the side of ease just 1% o ft h et i m e-t h ec o r r e s p o n d i n gﬁgure for outsiders is in
the region of 20%. Mervyn King who dissented 16% o ft h et i m et y p i ﬁes the kind of dissent voting behaviour
associated with insiders - all of his dissents were on the side of tightness.26 Contrastingly, outsiders like
Christopher Allsopp, DeAnne Julius and Sushil Wadhwani cast all of their dissenting votes on the side of ease.
At this point, it is perhaps useful to compare BoEMPC and FOMC levels of dissent. Meade and Sheets
(2002) report that over the period 1978-2000, only 198 out of 2403 votes cast by FOMC members were of
the dissenting variety. This amounts to about 8% of all votes cast. Contrast this with the voting behaviour
of Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee members. For the ﬁrst ﬁve years of the MPC, 106 out of
642 votes cast were dissenting in nature - over 16% of votes cast. Crudely put, it would appear that MPC
members are twice as likely to dissent than FOMC members.27
Table 2 shows the percentage of dissenting votes for tighter (looser) policy as percentage of dissenting
votes only. The percentages shown here diﬀer from those given in round brackets in Table 1 in so far as
values in the latter table are calculated as a percentage of all votes cast, irrespective of whether they are
dissenting or not. The ﬁg u r e st h u sh a v eab a s i si nconditional probabilities. For example, since the category
‘Dissents for tighter (looser) policy as % of all dissents’ corresponds to the probability of dissenting on the side
of tightness (looseness) given a dissenting vote is cast.28 Some of the results must be treated with caution.
Three insiders - two with a 100% record for casting dissenting votes on the side of tightness (Paul Tucker and
Andrew Large) and one with a 100% record on the side of ease (Charles Bean) each only cast one dissenting
vote.29 Nevertheless, even when bearing this in mind, results show that ﬁve out of the six insiders who cast
dissenting votes30 all voted on the side of tightness the majority of the time, the exception being Charles
Bean. Contrastingly, of the nine outsiders shown to have cast dissenting votes, six voted on the side of ease
on the majority of occasions.31 Of these six members, ﬁve voted on the side of ease 100% of the time.32
Whereas the vast majority of dissenting votes cast by insiders are on the side of tightness (86%),t h eo p p o s i t e
is true for outsiders, for whom the overwhelming majority of dissenting votes are cast on the side of ease (75%).
Table 3 displays the results of paired t-tests33 conﬁrming that the proportion of dissenting votes cast by
insiders and outsiders on a meeting by meeting basis are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent. Tests were applied across
both groups for each category of dissent voting.34 Section A.1 shows that although insiders dissent and
dissent for looser policy signiﬁcantly less often than outsiders, there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in dissents for
tighter policy between the two groups.35 Section B.1 compares each group’s propensity to vote on the side
of tightness or looseness. Clear-cut statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences arise between insiders and outsiders.
Dissent for tighter policy is signiﬁcantly higher for insiders than for outsiders. Further, dissent for looser
26For this reason, Mervyn King earned himself a reputation as a ‘hawk’ in the ﬁrst ﬁve years of the MPC. An interesting
question is were all twelve of Mervyn King’s dissents on the side of ease, would he still have become the Governor of the Bank?
27Comparison with other committees is also of interest. Nobuyuki Nakahara (2001), member of the Policy Board of the Bank
of Japan, attributes diﬀerences in the dissent voting behaviour of members of the monetary policy committees of the Bank of
England and Bank of Japan to individual accountability, attesting:
“I heard that Dr. DeAnne Julius, a former member of the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England,
said that when members are not individually accountable, they lose the incentive to make public their position
at the voting stage even if they had voiced opposing views during the debate, and that it will become easier for
the majority, which would include the most inﬂuential individual, to carry the vote. To avoid this situation, the
parliament holds individual hearings. Although the connection is not clear, since April 1998, deputy governors,
though they are chosen from the staﬀ of the BoE, are known to have cast eleven minority votes on eight occasions.
As for the Bank of Japan, it was revealed at a recent parliamentary session that there had never been a division
of views of the governor and two deputy governors.” (emphasis added)
28In this sense, the percentages obtained for tighter and looser categories are formally expressed as
(Pr(Tighten|Dissent) × 100) and (Pr(Loosen|Dissent) × 100) respectively.
29No outsiders fall into this category.
30Namely David Clementi, Paul Tucker, Ian Plenderleith, Andrew Large, Mervyn King and John Vickers.
31The six members are Kate Barker, Stephen Nickell, Marian Bell, Christopher Allsopp, De Anne Julius and Sushil Wadhwani.
The remaining three individuals are Charles Goodhart, Sir Alan Budd and Willem Buiter.
32In this respect, only Stephen Nickell does not have a 100% record on the side of looseness for the sample period under
consideration.
33All calculations were performed using STATA 8.
34In Tables 1 and 2, estimates are calculated through pooling members votes - no attempt is made to distinguish between
meetings when performing our calculations.
35The rate of dissent for insiders is higher than for outsiders.
11policy is signiﬁcantly higher for outsiders than for insiders. The lower part of the table omits the Governor
from the sample. This is because the Governor frames the question on which a policy decision is based.
The same qualitative conclusions hold as for when the Governor is included, although they are slightly less
pronounced - the Governor has never dissented.
5 Career Characteristics of MPC Members
I now turn to determining whether a members’ career backgrounds have a bearing on dissent voting behaviour.
Although some judgement calls have been made in the construction of career variables, I distinguish between
the varied career experiences and backgrounds of MPC members36 using a broad range of categories. My
system of classiﬁcation covers only full time positions and secondments held by MPC members up to but not
including time working on the MPC. The time spent on the MPC is embodied in a binary variable for a
members type, which is employed in the estimation procedure. Excluded from the criteria are all part-time
positions, special advisory roles and academic consulting. Consequently, all time served on the MPC - which
technically constitutes a full-time position working for the Bank of England - is purposely neglected. Career
backgrounds are categorised according to years spent working in the following broadly deﬁned areas:
• Private Sector - refers to positions held in banking or the service industries and also covers manufac-
turing industries.
• NGO - refers to non-governmental organizations. Speciﬁcally, this covers both national and inter-
national independent research organizations such as the National Institute of Social and Economic
Research (NIESR) and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and
transnational institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Trade Organization
(WTO) and Bank for International Settlements (BIS).
• Government - denotes years spent working in the civil service.
• Academia - refers to years working at a university in an academic capacity.
• Bank - denotes the number of years employed at the Bank of England.
Individual member experience is displayed in Table 4. Other than Howard Davies and DeAnne Julius,
all MPC member have spent over half of their working lives within a single career category. No single
member has experience in more than three career categories. Sir Edward George, Ian Plenderleith, and
Charles Goodhart have spent most of their lives at the Bank; contrastingly, Mervyn King, Charles Bean,
John Vickers and Willem Buiter have spent most of their careers in academia. Table 5 builds on this
analysis, and measures the percentage of insiders and outsiders to have worked in each category. A much
greater percentage of insiders than outsiders have worked at the Bank of England (55.6% vs. 20%). The
same applies to experience in Government as civil servants (44.4% vs.40%), although the diﬀerence is less
pronounced. Outsiders dominate in all other areas - by substantial margins in the case of Academia and
NGOs, and by a less pronounced diﬀerence in the case of the Private sector.
Related to career backgrounds of MPC members is the suggestion that the level of expertise of MPC
members has through successive appointments been ‘diluted’. In June 2003, The Times aired precisely these
concerns.
“...there is concern that the level of academic expertise on the MPC has been diluted by recent
appointments. When the MPC was established, its members included academic heavyweights such as
Sir Alan Budd, former Chief Economic Adviser to the Treasury, and Charles Goodhart of the London
School of Economics. However, in recent years, the bias appears to have shifted to economists with a less
academic focus. These include Kate Barker, former chief economist of the CBI, and Sir Andrew Large,
former deputy chairman of Barclays and now a Bank of England Deputy Governor.”37
36Also see Goodhart and Meade (2002) for a breakdown of the career characteristics of MPC members. Note that the system
of classiﬁcation used in this chapter diﬀers slightly. Further, Goodhart and Meade (2002) base their results on data available
on the the Bank of England website. This data was felt to be somewhat limited in nature, and where necessary, career data was
obtained from other sources.
37The Times,J u n e1 6 th 2003.
12Insiders
Dissents for Tighter Policy as a Percentage 
(%) of Dissenting Votes
Dissents for Looser Policy as a Percentage 
(%) of Dissenting Votes
Eddie George 0 0
Howard Davies 0 0
Charles Bean 0 100
David Clementi 75 25
Paul Tucker 100 0
Ian Plenderleith 60 40
Andrew Large 100 0
Mervyn King 100 0




Charles Goodhart 100 0
Kate Barker 0 100
Sir Alan Budd 100 0
Stephen Nickell 33 67
Marian Bell 0 100
Christopher Allsopp 0 100
De Anne Julius 0 100
Sushil Wadhwani 0 100
Willem Buiter 53 47
Richard Lambert 0 0




aUnlike Table 6.1 it makes no sense to include a category which excludes the Governor from the sample,
as he has never cast a dissenting vote. All percentages are rounded to the nearest integer. A zero
appearing in both columns for any given member indicates no dissenting votes were cast. This only
applies to Eddie George, Howard Davies and Richard Lambert.  All other members dissented.
Breakdown of Dissenting Votes
Type of Dissenting Vote
Table 2.
dissents for tighter and looser policy expressed as a percentage of dissenting
votes
13Mean Percentage of Dissenting Votes including Governor
Section A.1 - Insiders versus Outsiders
Insiders Outsiders
Significance level of 
Difference*
All Dissents 8.0 26.0 1%
Dissents for Tighter Policy 7.0 6.4 NS
Dissents for Looser Policy 1.1 19.6 1%
Section B.1 - Tighter versus Looser Policy
Tighter Looser
All members 6.9 9.3 NS
Insiders 7.0 1.1 1%
Outsiders 6.4 19.6 1%
Mean Percentage of Dissenting Votes excluding Governor
Section A.2 - Insiders versus Outsiders
Insiders Outsiders
Significance level of 
Difference*
All Dissents 10.1 26.0 1%
Dissents for Tighter Policy 8.8 6.4 NS
Dissents for Looser Policy 1.4 19.6 1%
Section B.2 - Tighter versus Looser Policy
Tighter Looser
All members 7.8 10.5 NS
Insiders 8.8 1.4 1%
Outsiders 6.4 19.6 1%
Notes: *Significant differences are indicated for 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels.
NS indicates that the difference is not significant at the 10 percent level of significance
All percentages rounded to 1 decimal place.
Table 3.
testing for significant differences in insider and outsider
dissent voting behaviour using paired t-tests
14MPC Member Career Histories Prior to Joining the MPC
Insiders











Eddie George 2 9 0047
Howard Davies 3 0 8 10 0
Mervyn King 7 18 0 0 0
Ian Plenderleith 32 0 0 0 3
David Clementi 0 0 22 0 0
John Vickers 0 17 3 0 0
C h a r l e s  B e a n 01 80 7 0
P a u l  T u c k e r 1 2 0900
A n d r e w  L a r g e 0 02 85 0
Outsiders
Willem Buiter 0 23 0 0 1
Charles Goodhart 17 10 0 1 0
D e  A n n e  J u l i u s 04907
S i r  A l a n  B u d d 02 241 00
Sushil Wadhwani 0 8 10 0 0
Stephen Nickell 0 30 0 0 0
Christopher Allsopp 4 31 0 2 2
Kate Barker 0 0 21 0 6
Marian Bell 0 0 16 3 0
R i c h a r d  L a m b e r t 0 02 60 0
Source: MPC member CVs, various sources
Notes: The table covers full-time positions only.  Consultancy or advisory roles taken on a part-time basis are 
neglected.
Table 4.
Career backgrounds of MPC members






Insiders (%) 55.6 33.3 55.6 44.4 22.2
Outsiders ( % ) 2 07 06 04 04 0
All members (%) 36.8 52.6 58 42.1 31.6
Source: MPC member CVs
Table 5.
MPC Member Career Characteristics
A typical governmental response to this type of criticism is found in the second report of the Lords Select
Committee on the MPC (2001), which asserts that
“...it is economic expertise that would drive our choice [of MPC member], it is the capabilities of the
individual. The fact that we have someone who is an academic and whose principal subject has been the
labour market [Stephen Nickell] must also be balanced by the fact that we also have someone who came
straight from working with one of the biggest companies in our country and had a great deal of industrial
policy expertise in that sector [De Anne Julius]. We choose the best people we can ﬁnd with economic
expertise”38 (emphasis added)
Unfortunately, the notion of economic expertise says nothing about the relative hawkishness or dovishness of
an MPC member. It cannot generally be construed as a characteristic causing one to dissent more on the side
of monetary ease than tightness. All one can say it that an MPC member with relatively less expertise than
other members is prima face liable to made bigger mistakes than other members.39 However, to address
whether the level of academic expertise has diminished, it is possible to turn to Panels A.1 and A.2 shown
in the appendix. These reﬂect how the career backgrounds of MPC members have changed over time, using
the criteria established in previous sections. It shows the level of experience for the average MPC member
at each meeting. It is readily seen that the average level of academic experience - which might be used to
proxy academic expertise - has not dropped substantially over the ﬁrst ﬁve years of the MPC. However,
experience at the Bank of England - has dropped markedly, whilst Private Sector experience has risen. This
is true for insiders and outsiders alike.
6 Estimation
To determine the eﬀect of members’ career backgrounds on a propensity to dissent on the side of ease or
tightness I estimate a regression of the form
Zj = β0 + β1Type + β2Private sector + β3Government
+β3NGO + β3Academia + β3Bank + uj (1)
where Zj =1denotes a dissenting vote on the side of tightness and Zj =0is a dissenting vote on the side
of ease. In particular, denote
Z =0if ih,t <i ∗
maj,t (2)
and
Z =1if ih,t >i ∗
maj,t (3)
38Lords Select Committee on the MPC, Second Report, Response of the Government to the Report of the House of Lords
Select Committee on the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England (HL Paper 34, Session 2000-01), p 208.
39Unless, of course, members free-ride on the the opinions and opinions of more expert members.
16Intercept Type
Private 
sector Govt. NGOs Academia Bank
All members 0.62 0.57 -0.03 0.04 -0.05 -0.01 -0.01
 (0.004)* (0.000) (0.028) (0.047) (0.011) (0.22) (0.26)
* p-values in brackets (.)
No of obs = 106 Log likelihood = -44.7
McFadden's R
2 =0.44 Likelihood ratio χ
2(4) = 61.27  [p-value=0.000]
MPC members' loosen and tighten dissenting votes explained by career
backgrounds, June 1997-June 2003
Table 6.
Effect of career backgrounds on dissent voting behaviour:
binary logit estimates
where ih,t is member h’s ideal interest-rate as reﬂected in their vote in meeting t and i∗
maj,t is the interest-rate
chosen by the winning majority of MPC members at a given meeting.40 Type is a binary variable where a 1
is assigned if a member is an insider and a zero if an outsider. Estimations are performed in EViews 4.1 and
results are shown in Table 6. p values are given in round (.) brackets.41 Results suggest that experience at
the Bank of England and Academia have no impact on dissent voting behaviour - this is clear from the high
p-values associated with their coeﬃcients. All other variables have a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on voting
behaviour. Exerting by far the largest impact is the binary variable Type. A positive value indicates that
insiders are more likely to dissent on the side of tightness. This result is in line with the ﬁndings reported
in Tables 1-3. Experience in the Private Sector and NGOs promote dissent on the side of monetary ease,
whilst the coeﬃcient on government indicates that time spent in the civil service promotes dissents on the
side of tightness. All of these variables are signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Coeﬃcients for these variables are
all similar in magnitude, although the eﬀect of a members type exerts by far the largest inﬂuence on the
decision to dissent on the side of ease or tightness. The rise in private sector experience in Panels A.1 and
A.2 coincides with a gradual decrease in interest rates, and is also seen lead to promote dissenting on the
side of ease in the career characteristics regression. The increase in average Private Sector experience seems
to be at the expense of experience at the Bank.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
At the outset of this paper, I set out to explain the type and frequency of dissenting votes cast by insiders
and outsiders. To rationalise ap r i o r iwhy any discrepancies between the two groups might arise, I appealed
to career incentives, career backgrounds, the appointments procedure, term lengths and the information sets
of MPC members. I predicted that (i) outsiders would dissent signiﬁcantly more often than insiders and (ii)
whereas insiders would dissent overwhelmingly on the side of monetary tightness, outsiders would dissent on
the side of monetary ease. In all cases, these conjectures were backed up by a rich array of evidence ranging
from the past experiences of FOMC members to spoken evidence given by BoEMPC members at Treasury
40This excludes all votes in cast agreement with the winning majority of MPC members for any given meeting. This occurs
in instances where ih,t = i∗
maj,t.
41Given the limited number of observations, the econometric speciﬁcation has been kept simple. In doing so, my purpose is
to gain a broad feel for nature of the relationship between career backgrounds, a member’s type and their decision to vote on
the side of tightness or ease. It is noteworthy that whilst I have controlled for a member’s type using an intercept dummy,
interaction dummies have not been applied. This was imposed for two reasons. The ﬁrst relates to the small sample size. It
was felt that adding interaction terms this would use up signiﬁcant degrees of freedom, resulting in a less than parsimonious
speciﬁcation. Secondly, I have assumed that the marginal eﬀects of a given career background on a member’s propensity to vote
o nt h es i d eo ft i g h t n e s so re a s es h o u l dap r i o r ibe the same. Marginal eﬀects are not reported due to the negligible size of the
parameters on career variables when compared to the coeﬃcient for the type dummy.
It has also been brought to my attention that the data sample may suﬀer from clustering. This arises when observations
are no longer independent, and implies that the sample joint distribution function is no longer the product of the distribution
functions for each observation. Consequently, this results in a log-likelihood which is not true for the sample. In the context of
my data-set, clustering might be thought to occur if some members dissent signiﬁc a n t l ym o r eo f t e nt h a no t h e r s .F o re x a m p l e ,
consider the frequency of dissent voting behaviour associated with Willem Buiter, as compared to Charles Goodhart. The
formar dissented far more frequently than the latter. Due to the limited sample size, I do not adjust for cluster eﬀects. For an
informative discussion of the issue, the interested reader is referred to Wooldridge (2003).
17select committee hearings.
I proposed that insiders have more of an incentive to agree with each other because as members of the
same organisation, they are more likely to have to work with each other in the future - disagreeing too much
with one’s peers may be detrimental to future career advancement. Insiders may also have more of an
incentive to act like ‘conservative’ central bankers. This implies that if insiders choose to dissent, it will
most likely be on the side on monetary tightness. In terms of appointments and term lengths, outsiders
have least independence from the Chancellor: they are both (i) directly appointed by the Chancellor and
(ii) serve the shortest term lengths. If one is seeking reappointment, then voting for lower, as opposed to
higher interest rates may secure a second term. It is important to note that even though the Governor of
the Bank is appointed by the Government, his independence is somewhat reinforced through serving a longer
term length. Further, given the opaque nature of the appointments procedure, it is also possible that an
outsider may be appointed precisely because he or she is a dove. It is arguably more diﬃcult to appoint an
opportunistic or dovish Governor given the intense public scrutiny and attention surrounding the decision in
the news media and ﬁnancial markets. Turning to information sets, outsiders are more likely to dissent on
the side of monetary ease in as far as they pay less attention than insiders to the Bank’s suite of in-house
forecasting models which (i) tend to over-predict inﬂation and (i) have too pessimistic a view about the level
of potential output. This may also promote dissents on the side of monetary tightness by insiders.
The predictions listed above were fully supported by the evidence. In practice, outsiders dissented signif-
icantly more often than insiders. Secondly, whereas insiders dissent overwhelmingly on the side of monetary
tightness, the reverse was found to be true for outsiders. These diﬀerences were found to be statistically
signiﬁcantly. I also presented evidence suggesting that the level of ‘expertise’ on the MPC was not diluted
over time, using the mean number of years working in a university in an academic capacity as a measure. In
short, the academic focus on the MPC remains high.
In the ﬁnal section I tested for the impact of career backgrounds on members propensity to dissent on
the side of ease or tightness using binary logit analysis. This is an approach which is commonly applied in
studies of FOMC member voting. It was found that for the case of the BoEMPC, evidence to support the
notion that career backgrounds impact on the propensity to dissent is weak. A problem I encountered was
predicting ap r i o r ithe eﬀects speciﬁc career backgrounds exert on dissent voting - particularly with respect to
experience in government and academia. It is not immediately obvious why experience in the Private Sector
and NGOs promotes dissent on the side of monetary ease, whilst time spent in the civil service promotes
dissents on the side of tightness. Nevertheless, the eﬀects of these variables are clearly marginal compared
to the eﬀects for the dummy variable capturing a member’s type. It may be the case that the sample size is
too small - it is somewhat truncated in that it uses only dissenting votes, and votes cast in agreement with
the majority are ignored.
The results of the analyses presented here have ramiﬁcations for the future conduct of UK monetary
policy. I have evidenced clear asymmetries in both the levels and type of dissent associated with insiders and
outsiders. Monetary policy is delegated to committees for a number of reasons. Many of the arguments
are founded on the beneﬁts of heterogeneity - MPCs are assumed to reach better decisions because members
pool information and exchange diﬀerent views. If career concerns are present, such informational pooling
and exchange of views might not take place. Some members may eﬀectively be scared of speaking out. In
the context of the BoEMPC, one solution to this problem would be to reduce the number of insiders sitting
on the committee. Whilst this may increase the level of dissent, it is possible that it may increase the quality
of the decision.
188 Appendix
8.A Average Career Experiences of All MPC Members, Insiders and Outsiders
per Meeting
The following two panels plot the average career experiences of MPC Members over time. Panel A.1.
focuses on the MPC as a whole, and is based on all MPC members, insiders and outsiders inclusive. The
upper and lower ﬁgures in Panel A.2 (overleaf) show the results for insiders and outsiders separately.
















































































































Source: MPC Member CVs
Panel A.1.
Average MPC member career experiences per meeting
196.A.1. Average Career Experiences of All MPC Members, Insiders and Outsiders
per Meeting (continued)
















































































































Source: MPC Member CVs
















































































































Source: MPC Member CVs  
Panel A.2.
Average MPC member career experiences per meeting by type
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